Introduction
As I put the finishing touches on this essay, a World Cup soccer match was being played in the Royal Bafokeng Stadium, a short distance from my office. As helicopters circled, vuvuzelas blared, and crowds of foreign visitors swarmed around the village of Phokeng, the tensions between an ever more commercially successful "ethnic corporation" (Cook 2005 ) and a struggling community of previously disadvantaged people, had never been more stark. This essay seeks to explore the tensions and contradictions inherent in the Royal Bafokeng Nation's status as both community and corporation. As one of South Africa's approximately 750 "traditional communities," the Royal Bafokeng Nation is 3 an interesting case of South African-style democracy, wherein a parliamentary democracy governed by a liberal Constitution nevertheless recognizes and protects indigenous forms of governance that support patriarchal rule and communal forms of land tenure. The Royal Bafokeng Nation is also-and on the other hand--one of South Africa's largest community-based investment companies, which channels revenue derived from mineral deposits into a broad investment portfolio that in turn funds an aggressive social development program in twenty-nine rural villages. What tensions arise when an ethnically-based polity seeks to maximize its financial standing by becoming a player on the global commodities stage? What contradictions inhere in a communally-organized and administered "tribe" using the mechanisms of the market to secure a measure of autonomy from state structures? Does the "ethnic corporation" become more or less "traditional" as it starts to deploy the tools and techniques of corporate governance alongside patriarchal governance? These are some of the questions posed in this essay, as well as in the article by Jessica Cattelino in this volume. While the Bafokeng case and the Florida Seminoles represent some striking similarities, Cattelino's essay explores the state/society divide, as it is both practiced and produced in the context of the Florida Seminoles' global business interests. This analysis of the Royal Bafokeng Nation's process of corporatization draws into focus the power of the current legislative environment to shape the business strategies of indigenous groups.
Covering an area of 1400 km 2 in South Africa's North West Province, and home to approximately 300,000 people, the Bafokeng people date their arrival in the Rustenburg valley to around 1450 (Hall, Anderson, Boeyens, and Coetzee 2008; Huffman 2007; Mbenga and Manson 2010 
"The Richest Tribe in Africa"
The governance structure of the Bafokeng Nation is not unusual in the communities recognized as "traditionally-governed" in South Africa. A patriarchal, hereditary system headed by a kgosi and divided up into wards is common to Tswana-speaking communities in both South Africa and Botswana (Schapera 1952, Schapera and Comaroff 1991) . What sets the Bafokeng apart is the fact that they own their land, and have successfully exercised their rights to both its surface and underground assets. that the community must begin to buy the title deeds to their land if they were to avoid total dispossession (Coertze 1988 What is clear is that the history of Bafokeng land ownership and the worldwide platinum boom of 1996-2008 is a very powerful combination.
Overview of the Bafokeng asset base
Under the leadership of Kgosi Leruo, the Bafokeng Nation (through its Council and Bafokeng lawyers and accountants say they will argue that the living standards of community members will decrease if the royalties are expropriated by the state, constituting a breach of the Constitution's expression of the "real rights" of individuals living under the protection of the state. In this negotiation over taxes, the Royal Bafokeng Nation explicitly positions itself as a community, and a not-for-profit enterprise assisting the state with its responsibilities, whereas the state would earn more tax revenue if it could convincingly argue that the RBN is a private company.
RBH and BEE: Big Deal?
In the current investment environment in South Africa, the RBN's status as a community investor, and in particular a "black" community investor, is again highly
salient. BEE-Black Economic Empowerment-refers to a set of regulations in South
Africa that determines how companies operating in specific sectors (mining, telecommunications, construction, etc.) must transform their shareholder base and governance structures to include more "previously disadvantaged" (understood to include black, "Coloured" and Indian) people. State-awarded tenders are only open to those companies that comply with their sector's "transformation charters" by selling shares to black investors or broad-based investment groups (such as Royal Bafokeng
Holdings) and appointing black managers and directors. Large corporations in South
Africa have thus, since 2005, been seeking "empowerment partners" to meet their targets. Many of these partners have been members of the small black elite who were already well connected politically, and were able to amass huge personal fortunes through these new laws. Vocal critics of the policies have thus pushed through reforms to the original laws, in an effort to pioneer more broadly based empowerment practices (Hamann 2004 , Rajak 2006 , 2009 ).
In contrast to these few wealthy individuals, RBH is a black-owned investor whose vision is to become the world's leading community-based investment company. Niall
Carroll, the CEO of RBH, calls this vision "social capitalism:" using the mechanisms of the free market to benefit the collective. Thabo Mokgatlha remarks that corporate South Africa is, by and large, very conservative, and prefers "traditional investors" to broad-based investment groups like RBH. Individual investors can be wined and dined and invited for a round of golf to discuss corporate strategies. behalf of a small group of individual investors, but rather under the guidance of 300,000 shareholders. This is what is meant by "broad-based" investment, the assumption being that all 300,000 people benefit from the dividends from these
investments.
To what extent is this actually the case, and what are the implications for RBH's status as a preferred BEE partner if the benefits to the community are actually more of a drip than a flow? This is a persistent theme in policy debates within and around the Royal Bafokeng Nation. To date, the benefits of being "the richest tribe in Africa"
have been communal and infrastructural rather than individual and financial:
electrified homes with clean water, better schools and clinics, more paved roads and community halls, etc. At kgotha-kgothe and other public gatherings, people's sense of frustration at not having more direct access to the communal purse is evident. From the perspective of the more communally-minded, the Kgosi is responsible for the well-being of the Nation, and the Nation is suffering; something must be done. This idea resonates with the political economies of pre-capitalist societies where the chief/leader was expected to maintain a surplus of grain/herds of cattle, in the event of a shortage among the people. Through patron/client relations, and networks of subchiefs (dikgosana), the surplus could (and should) be distributed as necessary to prevent starvation in years of poor rainfall or disease. In the current context, the implication is clear: it is unacceptable to many that the RBN's investment portfolio is valued in the hundreds of millions of dollars, whereas unemployment is conservatively estimated at 40% and most Bafokeng households subsist on approximately $100/month (Thompson 2008) .
How does the Kgosi and his administration respond to these allegations? By espousing "Vision 2020," the overarching vision of the Royal Bafokeng Nation, that strives to create an "enabling environment" (read: education, good security, availability of jobs) so that members of the Royal Bafokeng Nation can prosper as individuals by the second decade of the twenty-first century. Dependency on a paternalistic regime, in other words, is no longer a necessary part of the plan.
Achieving such a goal is a long-term process, however, with few successful models or precedents in Africa. The internal discourses of communalism, paternalism, and kinship-based favoritism are on a collision course with a newer rhetoric of individual empowerment, entrepreneurship, and meritocracy. And of course the criteria for membership in the Nation itself becomes more and more salient as the benefits of membership become more pronounced. As the Comaroffs argue in Ethnicity, Inc.
(2009), "inclusion and exclusion" is a key dimension to ethnically-defined enterprise.
But the direction of this trend is not a foregone conclusion in the Bafokeng Nation.
While the Comaroffs argue (correctly, in my view) that "the more that ethnically defined populations move toward the model of the profit seeking corporation, the more their terms of membership tend to become an object of concern, regulation, and contestation" (2009: 65), it does not automatically follow that the Bafokeng powersthat-be will privilege "biology and birthright, genetics and consanguinity, over social and cultural criteria of belonging." A recent case suggests another possibility. As the Royal Bafokeng Institute brings a higher level of academic opportunity and extracurricular options to the forty-five schools on Bafokeng land, the benefits accrue not only to the ethnic Bafokeng children enrolled in these schools, but also to the nonBafokeng (who outnumber Bafokeng in some schools). When Bafokeng families whose children attend schools outside the Bafokeng territory (mostly middle-class families who can afford the higher fees at the former "model C" schools) recently threatened to disrupt programs unless their children were included, the response from the Bafokeng administration was: "the educational programs are for those who entrust their children to our schools; if you enroll your children elsewhere, tough luck."
While this may appear anomalous within the specific "formula" for ethnic Bafokeng Nation, the vision of the school has been transformed under Kgosi Leruo into a competitive independent school cum teacher-training facility at the center of Vision 2020's strategy for education reform. Designed to meet global standards of educational excellence, the total enrollment at Lebone II is capped at 800 (Kindergarten-Grade 12), and the planned mix of students is 70% Bafokeng students, and 30% non-Bafokeng (including white, Indian, non-Bafokeng black, and international students). The curriculum prepares students for the South African national exams, but also enables students to study for the International Baccalaureate (IEB), which positions them to apply to universities anywhere in the world. The school's new campus reflects the principles of green building, total integration with the local landscape and climate, and the school's role as a "teaching hospital" for forty-five schools in the Bafokeng region. The fee structure features a sliding scale, and all applicants take an entrance exam to determine academic ability.
For many Bafokeng, this unique and important institution is nothing more than an elitist institution satisfied to educate a few Bafokeng at the highest standards, leaving the rest to suffer the limited economic opportunities that inevitably accompany a diploma from the inferior state schools. The idea of Lebone II as a training centre for forty-five primary and secondary schools, whose teachers and principals have never been exposed to high standards of content knowledge, pedagogy, teacher-parent interaction, extra-mural activities, etc., is lost on many who are desperate for a pathway out of poverty. The rewards seem to be accruing to too few, and to the rest too slowly. But even with third-party funding, Lebone II is an expensive project (in excess of USD 56 million), and it will be at least ten years before the families of the students enrolled there will reap the economic benefits of the resources being invested. Many in the community feel that this is an unacceptable use of the resources that their forebears worked so hard to secure a century and a half ago. This pervasive sense of entitlement to a piece of the Bafokeng cake is one of the most difficult challenges for the current Bafokeng policy-makers, including this anthropologist.
Conclusion
I've tried to show, through a discussion of the Bafokeng Nation's status as landowner, its control over some of the world's largest platinum deposits, and its resulting status as a major investor in South Africa, that the community's long-term strategy depends on its status as both community and corporation. As a recognized traditional authority, the community is able to maintain patriarchal and hereditary forms of governance that exist alongside, but in many ways supersede, the state's political mechanisms. As a universitas persona, the Nation also enjoys tax-exempt status, enabling it to marshal its resources for the benefit of the immediate community, rather than allowing its dividends to be dissipated by the national treasury and its highly bureaucratic spending programs.
On the other hand, the Nation has embarked on an aggressive corporatization process in order to capitalize on its platinum interests and ensure the financial viability of the The bottom line, as it were, for the Royal Bafokeng Nation, rests on a paradox. In order to successfully pursue its goal of being a major player in the global commodities market, the Bafokeng have adopted conventional corporate strategies and outlooks. As a community committed to perpetuating non-democratic forms of governance, the Bafokeng Nation has also clung to its status as a chieftainship, communal land administrator, and patriarchal society. The financial advantage in this is that the community, to date, has retained a tax-exempt status. The appeal in remaining a tribal authority extends well beyond the R220 million/year benefit, however. There is a cultural patina to Royal Bafokeng Holdings that, despite
Mokgatlha's comments about the drawbacks of being a communal investor, lends it an aura of uniqueness, potential, and vision. "A poor community that has its act together," as the former U.S. Ambassador to South Africa, Eric Bost, put it; the Bafokeng Nation represents the convergence of need, political will, and resources --a highly attractive combination for investors, development professionals, and politicians alike. Bafokeng Inc., in fact, relies crucially on the simultaneous pursuit of tradition and modernity, the communal and the private, the local context and the global marketplace. And beyond the immediate (albeit ambitious) goals to achieve basic development and economic sustainability for the Bafokeng people, there are those who see the potential for the Bafokeng Nation to develop a policy/governance model with "contemporary relevance for the continent," in the words of a writer for
The New York Times (2010). The World Economic Forum, United Nations, and
World Bank all follow the Bafokeng approach to combating "the resource curse" with interest. With its relatively small area and population, impressive resources and professional competencies, the Bafokeng Nation aspires to more than providing for people's basic needs. Environmentally-sustainable mining, the mass-enrollment of 20 girls in sports, early childhood education, and decentralized HIV/AIDS treatment programs are only some of the localized answers to deeply entrenched problems that might yield far-reaching solutions.
It is ultimately the South African Constitution and current political dispensation that has allowed the Bafokeng Nation to straddle the line between traditional community and private corporation. As the legislative environment changes, it is possible, even likely, that the Bafokeng leadership will have to shift its strategy in pursuit of its goals. At the present juncture, however, the Nation's dual status is allowing it to amass wealth and maintain non-democratic structures in a way that many view, paradoxically, as "progressive" and "visionary."
